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INTRODUCTION
The country that will play host to the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea can afford to put forth one of the
oldest and most respectable claims in Latin America to relationship
with the legal order of the oceans. Since it has fallen to Venezuela
to assume the task renounced by Chile as a consequence of a sudden
change of government in Santiago, an extremely vigorous and deep
sense of responsibility has pervaded high official echelons, as well
as scientific circles and internationally-minded groups and intellectuals. The news of the change in host countries broke toward the
end of 1973, a year officially designated as the "Year of Maritime
Reassertion,"' since it was exactly 150 years ago-July 24thwhen Colombia's young navy dealt a decisive blow to Spain's
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1. Decree No. 1.050 dated July 21, 1972 in Gaceta Oficial de la Republica de Venezuela, No. 29.861, XCIX,X, July 22, 1972.
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better-equipped fleet on the waters of Lake Maracaibo. 2 A few
weeks after the announcement Venezuela went to the polls and it
just happened that the main opposition party, which won, will be
in charge when the Conference is scheduled to be opened on June
20, 1974.
These facts and others of local political color will not, by any
means, divert the next Government's attention from such an important commitment to the international community. The host
country is fully aware of the significance of the event at a time
when so much has been said, written and discussed about the sea.
Two discernible instances, separated by a generation and thirty
years, affirm Venezuela's major contributions to a long and patient
universal legislative process in which custom and convention have
alternated with one another to consolidate an emerging public order of the sea: surface, waters, bottom and subsoil. Two main issues, therefore, will be briefly dealt with in this article. The first
concerns the earliest treaty ever concluded between two States to
delimit, explore and exploit a submerged area, namely, the AngloVenezuelan Gulf of Paria Treaty of 1942; the second brings to a focus the Venezuelan concept of the patrimonial sea, a compromise
proposal introduced in the United Nations Sea-Bed Committee de
lege ferenda as an official thesis in 1971. ,Obviously, a brief survey of the developments in the law of the sea considered relevant
to the subject matter, during the thirty-year time gap, could not be
comfortably omitted.

I. PRECURSORY PRMCIPLES OF THE CONTNMENTAL
SHELF DocTrmnE
The quest for oil may well be recognized at some future date as
the most transcendent single economic fact of the Twentieth Century. When oil was first pumped out of a land well, chances were
very slim that the new-born industry would some day plunge into
the sea.
Nevertheless, on a July day in 1923, four American oilmen struck
oil under the waters of Maracaibo Lake in Venezuela while drilling in what was then known as the "kilometer strip"-a concession
just one kilometer wide which followed the shore and was reputed
as the worst and least rewarding part of an oil deal. John Tay2. It may be recalled that Venezuela, Colombia and Ecuador used to
be knovn as Colombia, sometimes referred to as Greater Colombia, under
the presidence of Simon Bolivar.
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lor, a Panama Canal construction old hand, led the group who
forced the jet out of the bottom of the lake quite close to the shore.3
It appears that back in 1912, there was a visionary-Charles
Eckes from British Equatorial Guinea-who had prophetically asserted that the most fabulous oil resources in the whole region
lay beneath the waters of the lake. Towards the end of 1923, Lago
Petroleum Corporation sought and obtained concessions over deeper
lake areas. One of its men, Red Watson, built a rustic platform and
got 60,000 barrels a day from a depth of 10 feet. What followed
can be easily imagined: better technique, deeper drilling and more
oil. By the mid-thirties Maracaibo Lake was yielding at a depth
of 100 feet, 15 miles off the coast. 4 It may be recalled that it was
not before October 6, 1931, that Pure Oil Company and Superior
Oil started their joint drilling operation a little more than a mile
off the coast of Louisiana at a depth of 14 feet. 5
Maracaibo's experience was followed by a strong repercussion in
the oil industry, but it did not bear on the law of the sea because
of the obvious reason that the whole Maracaibo Lake falls within
a State's national sovereignty. But it did confer on Venezuela the
fame of an extraordinarily oil-gifted country, both on land and
under the sea.
On the other end of the country, no offshore drilling had been
undertaken when World War II broke out in 1939. Yet it was
suspected that the shallow Gulf of Paria, between Venezuela and
Trinidad, might reveal another miracle, especially if it be kept in
mind that Eastern Venezuela, too, had maintained a high level production of its own.
Paria, besides being the name of the finger-shaped peninsula
jutting from Venezuela's northeast into the sea, is a trapeziumlike inlet of the Atlantic Ocean, about 70 miles long by 30 wide,
which, though called a gulf, is the sum of two opposite and joining
inlets, one facing Trinidad and the other facing Venezuela, open
on the north towards the Caribbean Sea and on the southeast to3. Baptista, "En el Lago de Maracaibo, la industria petrolera aprendio
a nadar", El Farol, Creole Petroleum Corporation, No. 239, XXXIH, Caracas: Oct./Nov.Dec. 1971, 57-69.
4. Id.
5. "After 25 years drillers are still learning how to cope with the
Gulf," Ball, Offshore, February 1972.

wards the Atlantic, off the alluvial delta of the Orinoco river; the
northern strait being Boco del Dragon and the southeastern, Boca
de la Serpiente. While there are four navigable channels along
the former, the latter contains five channels between islands and
submerged banks.0 It was in Paria, between Trinidad and Venezuela, where Christopher Columbus first beheld the South American
mainland on his third voyage.7 In 1797, a British expedition under
Abercromby forced the Spaniards to abandon Trinidad, thus establishing a colony off Venezuela's east coast, just thirteen years before
the proclamation of independence.
Oil shortage during the early stages of World War II might
have been the primary reason behind Great Britain's drive to explore the closer submarine areas of the Gulf. At a time when both
Venezuela -and Great Britain claimed only three miles of territorial sea,8 it would not have been consistent with either country's
stand to convert a maritime area open to free navigation into an
inland sea, though they probably could have worked out a joint
claim. Since a means to explore the submarine areas had to be
legally justified, Great Britain approached Venezuela whose attitude, at the outset, was cautiously receptive. After a pause that
permitted the Venezuelan government to take a second look at the
geological reality of the area in terms of the country's economy and
under the prevailing war circumstances, negotiations proceeded
between Dr. Caracciolo Parra Perez, Venezuelan Foreign Minister
and Mr. Donald St. Claim Gainer, British Minister-Resident in
Caracas.
A particularly significant issue is raised by the account given
a year later by the Venezuelan Foreign Minister before Congress
and published in the Yellow Book of the Ministry. According to
that report negotiations with Great Britain on the recognition of
Venezuela's sovereignty over Isla de Patos and on the "division"
of the submarine areas of Paria had begun in 1936.
Venezuela insisted on recovering the tiny Island of Patos in the
northern strait. Under British control, the islet-originally Venezuelan-would have bolstered Great Britain's negotiating position
and probably her share, at the expense of Venezuela. This issue
6. See Kennedy, United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea,
Official Records, Vol. 1 (A/CONF. 13/37 at 116-118).
7. W. D. & A. L. MARSLAND, VENEZUELA THROVGH ITS IsToy 23 (1954).
8. The Venezuelan government issued a decree dated September 15,
1939 (Gaceta Oficial del los Estados Unidos de Venezuela, No. 19.981 del
16 de setiembre de 1939) in which it ratified this measure while providing
that all bays, gulfs and inlets under exclusive national jurisdiction be
closed by drawing a straight line from headland to headland (Art. 2).
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settled, the first treaty to deal with the delimitation of submarine
areas in international law was signed in Caracas, on February 26,
1942.
In his book on the Continental Shelf, awarded the Grotius Prize
of the Institute of International Law in 1952, Dr. M.W. Mouton
from the Netherlands refers to the Paria Treaty in the second
paragraph of his Introduction:
The first instrument concerning this recent development was the
Treaty between the United Kingdom and Venezuela relating to the
submarine areas of the Gulf of Paria, of February 26, 1942, but
a real impetus to the development of a continental shelf theory
was only given by the Proclamation of President Truman with
respect to the natural resources of the subsoil and the sea-bed of
the continental shelf of September 28, 1945. This Proclamation
was followed
in a short time by declarations and decrees of other
9
countries.

It may be necessary, at this stage, to raise and attempt to answer
two fundamental questions. What legal principles and future usages were basically involved in the Gulf of Paria Treaty? On what
issue does it resemble or differ from the Truman Proclamation?
A. Principlesand usages involved
The sea-bed of the Gulf of Paria being a single shallow basin
whose average depth ranges from 10 to 20 fathoms (with an unusual 150 fathom canal in the northern entrance) raised no question whatsoever about its natural outer limit, which, otherwise,
would have been the continental slope. In other words, all that
they had to do was to divide the whole submarine area between one
another, the same way the United Kingdom and Norway, for example, proceeded with respect to the continental shelf of the North
Sea-a submarine area with similar characteristics-twenty-three
years later.
Both parties were careful to assert that the submarine areas fell
thoroughly outside their respective three-mile territorial limit, evidently because a State's right over the submarine areas within its
territorial limits could not be questioned, even in the absence of a
positive rule on the matter as is presently expressed in Article 2
of the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and the
9. M. W. MouToN,

THE CONTINENTAL SHEL at 1 (1952).

Contiguous Zone.10 As early as 1922 Sir Cecil Hurst had reiterated
a decision of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council "which
definitely lays down the rule that the Crown is the owner of the
bed of the sea (within the territorial limit)." Summing up he
added,
...

so far as Great Britain at any rate is concerned, the ownership

of the bed of the sea within the three-mile limit is the survival of more extensive claims to the ownership of and sovereignty
over the bed of the sea. The claims have become restricted by
the silent abandonment of the more extended claims. Consequently, where effective occupation has been long maintained of
portions of the bed of the sea outside the three-mile limit, those
claims are valid and subsisting claims, entitled to recognition by
other States."
Most probably Sir Cecil had in mind both sedentary fisheries outside the three-mile limit, as his own subtitle announces, and tunin the subsoil, as he interneling for mining or communications
12
prets Oppenheim's views.
Guided by this principle, Parra Perez and St. Clair Gainer agreed
to exclude submarine areas under territorial waters expressly
from the areas to be delimited, as they stated in Article 1 that the
term "submarine areas of the Gulf of Paria" denoted the sea-bed
and subsoil outside of the territorial waters of the High Contracting Parties.
Article 2 contains a mutual declaration in two separate paragraphs whereby the King of Great Britain and Northern Ireland,
and the President of the United States of Venezuela,' 3 recognize
each country's exclusive rights and pledge not to assert any claim on
one or the other side of three consecutive artificial lines A-B,
B-Y and Y-X drawn on an annexed map as stated in Article 3.
Briefly described, Line A-B runs diagonally across the Gulf beginning well within its natural limits south of Boca Dragon (northern
strait) in a northeasterly-southwesterly direction; Line B-Y extends for a short distance along Venezuela's territorial limit,
10. "The sovereignty of a Costal State extends to the air space above
the territorial sea as well as its bed and subsoil." Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, done at Geneva, April 29, 1958
(1964), 15 U. S. T. 1606, T. I. A. S. No. 5639, 516 U. N. T. S. 205.
11. Hurst, Whose is the Bed of the Sea?, 4 Bfa.

Y.B. IirW.

L. 34,

(1923-1924).
12. Id. It may be added that the Geneva Convention on the Continental

Shelf covers this aspect in Art. 7, which was approved at the Conference
at the request of the British delegation, despite the fact that it had not
been submitted by the International Law Commission. 6 United Nations
Conference on the Law of the Sea, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 13/C.4/L.44 (1958).

13. The official name since 1953 is Republica de Venezuela.
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while Line X-Y was drawn in an exact west-east direction across
the southern entrance.
Article 4 provides for the manner of demarcating the aforesaid
lines. Articles 5 and 6, on the other hand, while aff irming that the
Treaty only refers to the submarine areas of the Gulf of Paria, establish that nothing should be held to affect the status of islands,
islets or rocks, neither the status of the waters of the Gulf of
Paria or any rights of passage or navigation on the surface of the
seas outside the respective territorial waters. The second half of
Article 6 insists that passage or navigation shall not be closed or
impeded by any works or installations which may be subsequently
erected.
Article 7 affirms that each party shall take all measures to prevent the exploitation of any submarine areas claimed or occupied
from causing the pollution of the territorial waters of the other by
oil, mud or any other fluid or substance liable to contaminate the
navigable waters or the foreshore, while Article 8 states that each
party shall cause stipulations for securing the effective observance
of the two proceeding articles in any concession which may be
granted for the exploitation of submarine areas in the Gulf of
Paria.
While Article 9 stipulates resorting to peaceful means as recognized by international law for the settlement of disputes, the following and last Article 10 takes care of the legal formalities. The
Treaty came into force on September 22, 1942.14
With reference to the Geneva Convention on the Continental
Shelf as the positive law in force among nations, de lege lata, we
may be able to trace back to the Gulf of Paria Treaty many of the
principles and rules embodied in the Convention. Admitting the
validity of two arguments which Lauterpacht levels at the Treaty
when he stresses that it does not refer to the continental shelf eo
nomine, neither does it "delimit the outer frontiers of the annexed
area by reference to a conventional depth of the continental shelf
(for the reason, apparently, that the Gulf as a whole does not
14. Both Spanish and English texts are legally valid. For the Spanish

text see 6 Tratados y Acuerdos Publicos de Venezuela 719. The English
text is in [1940-1942] British and Foreign State Papers 1067. Also in U.S.
Dep't of State, International Boundry Study, Limits in the Sea, THE
GEoGRAPHE
(Mr. 6, 1970).

reach that depth) ,"-' we may recall, however, that during the early
stages of the development of the doctrine the term "submarine
areas" was tantamount to continental shelf in its legal acceptation. 6
On the following principles and/or issues the Gulf of Paria
Treaty was pioneer and forerunner:
a. The establishment of the rule that the submarine areas
(continental shelf) of a coastal State would legally start (inner
limit) precisely outside of the territorial sea, and by no means at
the law waterline along the coast where the territorial sea itself
is considered to start. It may be worthy to insist, perhaps, that
the Treaty says nothing about the outer limit.
b. Th6 assertion of a certain legal relationship between the coastal
State and the corresponding submarine areas (continental shelf)
in such a way as to be construed as outright annexation. In fact,
the subsequent Submarine Areas of the Gulf of Paria (Annexation) Order in Council of 6 August, 1942, declared Great Britain's
(later Trinidad and Tobago's) part of the Gulf's submarine areas
"to be annexed and form part of His Majesty's
dominions attached
'17
to the Colony of Trinidad and Tobago.
c. The implicit restriction of the resources object of any future
exploitation of the submarine areas (continental shelf) to oil and
associated products, as distinct from and opposed to natural, organic and renewable resources, such as demersal swimming fish or
crustacea. Nevertheless, neither the word "resources" was ex15. Lauterpacht, Sovereignty Over Submarine Areas, 27 BrT. Y.B. INTL'
L. 376 (1950). At that time there was a controversy regarding the nature
of submarine areas, especially if they constituted an inner or an outer
shelf, according to Umbgrove's classification cited by MouToN, supra note
9, at 7. The former would be shallow submarine basins whose sub-aerial
origin could be traced to rivers in Pleistocene times, like the North Sea,
the Gulf of Paria or the Sunda Sea. The latter would be submarine areas
that protrude on a slope beneath the open sea at a depth conventionally
held to be 200 meters, the figure 133 meters being an estimate much
closer to geological facts. According to this classification, an inner shelf
would be always locked by an opposite one.
16. Great Britain and the Netherlands, besides Sweden in a separate text,
preferred the term "submarine areas" to "continental shelf" as evidenced
in two proposals submitted to the Geneva Conference. 6 United Nations
Conference on the Law of the Sea, U.N. Doc. A.CONF. 13/C.4/L.32 &
L.33 (1958). If the Conference did not adopt their view, the fact that it
was submitted and considered is sufficient proof that both terms could be
held interchangeable from a legal point of view.
17. [1942] 1 Stat. Instr. 919. Also in British and Foreign State Papers
971 (1940-1942). The aforesaid Order in Council in its preambular part
affirms that "whereas the Government of Venezuela has annexed to Venezuela certain parts of the submarine areas of the Gulf of Paria." There
was no specific act or declaration of annexation on Venezuela's behalf.
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pressly employed, nor was fishing particularly mentioned, aside
from being implied as a surface activity that requires passage and
navigation.
d. The explicit separation between the newly-acquired rights of
the Contracting Powers to their respective submarine areas (continental shelf) and the freedom of passage and navigation inherent
to the status of the superjacent waters. This principle was bound
to go along the whole process of the juridical continental shelf
by announcing the beginning of a new legal order of the submarine space based on the respect of the traditional freedoms of the
corresponding maritime space above.
e. The admittance, in the interests of the other party, of certain
limitations on the exercise by the coastal State of its newly-acquired
rights with view to:
1.

preventing pollution of the marine environment, not
only by the coastal State itself, but also by concessionaires
acting on its behalf. Although protection from pollution
was aimed at the territorial waters of the opposite party
due to the absence of third parties in that particular area,
the subsequent mention of "navigable waters" implies the
first general reserve of its kind against marine pollution
resulting from the exploitation of the sea-bed.

2. safeguarding navigation from being closed or impeded by
works or installations which may be erected and "which
shall be of such a nature and shall be constructed, placed,
marked, buoyed and lighted, as not to constitute a danger
or obstruction to shipping."
f. The omission of any reference to the method applied by Venezuela and Great Britain in the delimitation of the Gulf of Paria.
The Treaty itself stands as an example that the agreement obtained
and the division prescribed therein were only possible through negotiation. This is an extremely important point since many an interested party in subsequent controversies has implied that the
equidistance method had been employed. Such an assertion is absolutely incorrect and misleading. 8
18. THE GEOGRAPHER, supra note 14, at 4. Cf. North Sea Continental
Shelf Cases [1969] I.C.J., opinion of Judge Fouad Ammoun, para. 26.
Netherlands and Denmark were not able to convince the Court that the

Before going any further, it should be kept in mind that the Anglo-Venezuelan Treaty of 1942, was not solely the outcome of one
party's interest in the continental shelf. To suggest that Great
Britain was the more anxious partner in clearing the matter may,
perhaps, depict a more objective and authentic picture of the world's
realities more than thirty years ago. When the Treaty is brought
to a focus in the light of Venezuela's contribution to the contemporary law of the sea, Great Britain's role should not be underestimated or misunderstood, stressing the fact that the United
Kingdom subsequently followed the same policy of extending the
boundaries of almost 'all her potentially oil-rich colonies, one by
one, from Brunei in Southeast Asia to the Falkland Islands, off
the southern end of Argentina. 19 Her Arab allies along the ArabPersian Gulf issued a series of statements in 1949, annexing the seabed and the subsoil beneath the high seas contiguous to their territorial waters, undoubtedly inspired by the Paria Treaty model
transmitted by Great Britain through her vast imperial system.
Yet there is one basic difference between the attitudes of Great
Britain and Venezuela towards the same agreement. While Great
Britain adopted the principle for her Asian and American overseas
colonies (Trinidad and Tobago acceeded to the provisions of the
Treaty on Independence in 1962), she had resisted the adoption of
any special measures to proclaim sovereignty or jurisdiction over
her own insular and proper submarine domains until 1964, when,
almost simultaneously, she became a party to the Geneva Convention.20 Venezuela, on the other hand, promulgated her own law on
the continental shelf (and other maritime provinces) in 1956, at a
time when there had been enough international consensus as to
justify a quasi universal appreciation of the doctrine.
The International Court of Justice process on the North Sea
Continental Shelf Cases, 1967-69, as well as the individual opinion
of the judges, redeemed the Paria Treaty from relative oblivion and
linked it permanently to the history of the genesis of the new doctrine. To Great Britain, it was an instrument of colonial policy
to be later bequeathed to the rightful successor; to Venezuela it was
an instrument of national policy to be cherished and built upon. 21
equidistance method had been employed in the Paria Treaty, not even by
imposing such lines on a map of the Gulf they produced. North Sea Continental Shelf Cases [1968] LC.J., 1 Pleadings and Oral Documents 437,

498.

19. The Argentine Government lays a historic claim to sovereignty over
the archipelago which receives the name of Islas Malvinas in Spanish.
20. See note 10, supra.
21. For an analysis of the Gulf of Paria Treaty see Vallat, The Continental Shelf, 23 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 333 (1946). Cf. Hounshell & Kemp,
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B. The PariaTreaty and the Truman Proclamation:
Similarities and Differences.
There can be no doubt that the Truman twin Proclamations on
the continental shelf and coastal fisheries given on September
28, 1945, constituted a turning point in the modern history of the
law of the sea. Quoting from Lauterpacht, "it was not, however,

until 1945 that the terminology and the attempt to provide a philosophy of the doctrine of the continental shelf made their appearance
in official instruments. '22 McDougal 'and Burke, after due reference to the Paria Treaty as the first development of international
prescriptions about the continental shelf, affirm that
... the major impetus for the large number of unilateral claims
to the resources of the continental shelf came, as we have noted,
in President Truman's pronouncements in 1945, declaring that the
United States regarded the natural resources of the subsoil and
sea bed of the continental shelf contiguous to the United States as
"appertaining to the United States, subject to its jurisdiction and
23
control"

To begin with, the Truman Proclamation was a unilateral federal act of the United States government, apparently more a restriction than it was an agreement between members of the international community. In practice, however, it was bound to produce a much more widely-felt reaction, because of the elementary
fact that an individual declaration could be imitated mutatis
mutandis, by so many individual declarations as their State authors might have desired, while a bilateral treaty cannot be invoked by a third party according to the rule res inter alios acta.
Obviously, it is easier to reproduce a unilateral declaration than to
have two States agree on reproducing a bilateral agreement, especially if it is too particular and exclusive as was the Gulf of Paria
Treaty.
Aside from this initial and basic difference, and despite the fact
that it belongs more to form than to substance, it may be interesting
to compare the same principles and/or issues in both historic documents:
The Continental Shelf: A Study in National Interest and InternationalLaw,
5 J. PuB. L. 343 (1956). Also in 2 0. DE FERaoN, LE DROIT INTERNATIONAL
DE LA

Mm 136-38.

22. Lauterpacht, supra note 15.
23. M. McDouGAL & W. BURKE, THE PuBLIc ORDER or TnE OcEANs 636-37
(1962).

a. On the inner limit of the juridical continental shelf, Truman's Proclamation implies a ratification of the principle set in the
Paria Treaty which establishes that the submarine areas (continental shelf) are considered to lie outside of the territorial waters
of both parties, though Truman defines it in different terms as
"the subsoil and sea-bed of the continental shelf beneath the
high seas but contiguous to the coasts of the United States." 24 The
President's caution not to set the interior limit of the continental
shelf at the outer limit of the territorial sea was probably meant
to keep silence over the States' rights to the shelf beneath the territorial limits in view of the question of to whom did those resources
belong: the Union or the individual States. The Submerged
Lands Act and the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act settled the
issue in 1953. At any rate and irrespective of the wording, Truman's Proclamation boils down to the same principle born in Caracas three years earlier: the inner limit of the juridical continental
shelf begins at the outset of the high sea.
Neither the Proclamation nor the annexed Executive Order No.
9633 mentioned anything about the outer limit of the continental
shelf, but a press note released on the same day stated that
generally, submerged land which is contiguous to the continent and
which is covered by no more than 100
fathoms (600 feet) of water
25
is considered as the continental shelf.

It fell to President Avila Camacho of Mexico, a month later, to define the shelf as "bounded by 26the 200-meters isobath," in the first
of the declarations that ensued.
b. On.the qualification of the legal relationship between the
coastal State and the continental shelf, the majority of authors
usually agree with Mouton when he asserted that the Paria Treaty
and the Truman Proclamation have generated two distinct tendencies manifest in the chain of unilateral acts and declarations registered between 1942 and 1952: one, the offspring of the Treaty,
emphasized the principle of the annexation of the continental
shelf by the coastal State; the other, following the Proclamation's
model, declared the principle of control and jurisdiction over the
natural resources of the shelf and their appurtenance to the coastal
State. Mouton added a third tendency: acts and declarations
24. Text of the Proclamation in 10 Fed. Reg. 12303 (1945). Also in Laws
and Regulations on the Regime of the High Seas, 1 U.N.L.S. 112 (1951).
25. Cited by DE FERRoN, supra note 21, at 155. Cf. The Outer Limit
of the Continental Shelf, 13 Juimm. REV. 111 (1968).
26. Text in F. DuRAm7, LA PiATTAFomwA LITORALE Nm DnuTro INTERNAZioNALE

289 (1955).

Also in MouToN, supra note 9, at 253.
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based on
a mixture of both, with or without foreign elements
27
added.
As it was partially anticipated, the first group included all British-inspired Orders in Council (Bahamas, Jamaica, British Honduras, Brunei, etc.), the similarly-patterned declarations of the
Arab-Persian Gulf Emirates, the proclamations of Saudi Arabia
and Pakistan, besides Nicaragua's 1948 constitution and Brasil's decree of 1950.
As fostering the control and jurisdiction principle of the Proclamation, Mouton was able to trace only two pure acts: the Philippine's Petroleum Act and Guatemala's Petroleum Law, both enacted in 1949.
The Proclamation did, however, build its claim to exclusive jurisdiction and control over the resources on a moral base of reason
and justice which rested on four pillars: 1) the dependence of
the utilization of the resources on the cooperation of the coastal
State, 2) the natural appurtenance of the continental shelf to the
land mass, 3) the frequent seaward extension of resources within
a State's territory, and 4) security interests of a State in activities
28
off its shores.
As it may be recalled, the Geneva Convention indulged in a long
and abstract debate on the qualification of the State's rights, with
delegations split between those who favored the word "sovereignty" and those who preferred "exclusive rights" instead of
"sovereign rights over the resources," orginally proposed by the
International Law Commission, more in support of the Proclamation's trend. To many a jurist and publicist, no real distinction
could be made between "annexation" and "appurtenance and exclusive control," as suggested by Lord Radcliffe, sitting as arbiter of
the Qatar dispute.
c. On the qualification of the natural resources of the continental shelf, the Presidential Proclamation did not give any specifications either, though in the preambular paragraphs it did
mention the mineral resources alone. However, it may be inferred from the fact that the American President issued another
27. M. Mouton, The Continental Shelf, in 85 RIECUE
(1954).

28. Juan. REV., supra note 25, at 131.

DES
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Proclamation (No. 2668) on the same day on coastal fisheries that
he did not harbor the intention of intermixing two issues that could
be otherwise split on the basis of the qualification of the resources
into mineral and biological. 29 The Submerged Lands Act of May
22, 1953, includes within the term natural resources: "oil, gas, and
all other minerals, and fish, shrimp, oysters, clams, crabs, lobsters, sponges, kelp, and other marine animal and plant life." But
it should not be forgotten that the terms of this Act shall not be
applied outside of three miles into the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans,
or of three marine leagues into the Gulf of Mexico, which renders it, by all means, an instrument of United States federal domestic legislation and not valid against other nations.8 0
d. On the status of the suprajacent waters as regards the free-

doms on the high seas, there is complete coincidence on the principle that recognizes this status. The Paria Treaty had only mentioned navigation and passage; the 1945 Proclamation referred to
free and unimpeded navigation; but the Outer Continental Shelf
Lands Act of August 7, 1953, stressed the right to navigation and
fishing.
e. The Proclamation does not contain any specific reference
to the prevention of pollution or to the adoption of measures directed at safeguarding navigation from perils that may ensue from
the erection of works -and installations. The right of unimpeded
navigation stressed in the Proclamation appears as a corollary to
the general principle of freedom on the high seas. The Treaty goes
much further than the proclamation in regulating the principle.
f. On the delimitation of the continental shelf among neighboring
states, whether opposite or adjacent, the Proclamation calls upon
the United States and other parties concerned to determine their
boundaries in accordance with equitable principles. Again, no
specific method is advocated, suggested, or implied.
In the light of the aforesaid, it would be quite correct to affirm that the prominent principles and characteristics of the early
continental shelf doctrine were embodied in the precursory Treaty
of the Gulf of Paria. Its most conspicuous shortcoming was the lack
of a fundamental philosophy that could have led to a universal conception of the doctrine, a task which the Truman Proclamation
outspokenly undertook.
Then, as already mentioned, the Paria Treaty was only a bilateral
agreement applicable to a specific area and binding upon two pow29. McODOUGAL & BURKE, supra note 23, at 637.

30. Text in Official Documents, 48 Am. J. INT'L L. 104 (1954).
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ers, one of which had to be replaced, twenty years later, by its rightful successor, the sovereign nation of Trinidad and Tobago. In
1958 it looked as if the Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf
had absorbed the process which had preceded the United Nations
Conference from which three other conventions emerged. Prob-ably it was thought that positive legislation through the United
Nations would overwhelm custom and States' usages as the prevail31
ing and most important source of the international law of the sea.
This hope was apparently ill founded, for neither did the Geneva
Conventions win the approval of an uncontested majority of maritime nations-especially if we bear in mind the growth into independence of more than fifty developing nations mainly in Africa,
the Caribbean area and Australasia-nor did they offer a panacea
for all the ills of the public order of the oceans. The loophole left
by the Second Geneva Conference held in 1960, as it was not able
either to fix the outer limit of the territorial sea or to agree on an
exclusive fishing zone, was further widened when the 200-mile
thesis, dormant for fifteen years, surged again to engulf the Atlantic
coasts of South America and threaten to reach other and distant
shores. Adding the action taken by Malta at the United Nations
with respect to the peaceful utilization of the sea-bed and ocean
floor beyond national jurisdiction to the looming perils of widespread marine contamination, the whole process stood for revision
by an international community quite distinct from its predecessor
when Great Britain and Venezuela proceeded to divide the submarine basin of the Gulf of Paria and President Harry S. Truman, with
the prestige of the United States 'behind him, recovered the continental shelf.
II.

TE CoN

vPORARY NOTION OF THE PATRIMONIAL SEA

If Venezuela's contribution to the development of the continental
shelf doctrine was registered at the start of a long, universal process,
her espousal of the modern patrimonial sea notion, on the other
hand, appears towards the end of the cycle as a logical bridge over
an abyss that separates two irreconcilable poles. Consequently, it
may become necessary to provide a short account of what has been
called a "long, universal process," so that the notion of the patri31. On the weight of custom and usages see C. CoLowaos, INTERNATIONAL
LAW or THE SEA 7 (6th ed. 1967).

monial sea might be appraised in its true dimensions as an eclectic
compromise based on sound legal grounds.
An extremely convenient point to take up this so-called "long,
universal process" would be Professor Mouton's statement on the
three kinds of acts and declarations that succeeded President Truman's Proclamations. The distinguished Dutch jurist and naval
expert classified these acts, from the viewpoint of their stand on
the nature of States' rights, into descendants of the Paria Treaty,
descendants of the Truman Proclamation and a third group described rather curiously as acts and declarations based on a mixture
of both, with or without foreign elements added.
What Mouton meant by "foreign elements" can be detected in
the drive of several Latin American coastal countries, later spreading to Korea, Viet Nam, Iceland, Morocco, Senegal and other fishing
nations, toward the elaboration of new rules of the contemporary
law of the sea. These rules have been based on the exclusive
jurisdiction of the coastal State over all kinds of fish and renewable
marine resources in the adjacent sea areas, needed to feed the population or to bolster the national economy, in the face of rigid,
classic Grotius-inspired norms which, for more than three hundred
years, have pretended to confine such jurisdiction to the limited
breadth of the territorial waters and sanction over-all fishing on
the high seas.
This drive can be reviewed in two stages: the early and the contemporary. The former goes back to the reaction set in motion
by the Truman Proclamations, when other nations-Mouton's third
group-saw in the continental shelf emerging practice and doctrine an unexpected lever to help them lay their own claims over
the renewable resources of the adjacent sea in which their true and
legitimate interests undoubtedly lodged. It is a trend that came
to a halt at the American States Specialized Conference of Ciudad
Trujillo (now Santo Domingo) held in 1956 when, in the words of
Richard Young, "the hard core of the continental shelf doctrine
which has won wide recognition in all parts of the world"'3 2 was
definitely separated from the issue of offshore claims advanced in
terms of fisheries and living resources. Officially, it came to a dead
end at the Second Geneva Conference in 1960.
The latter stage belongs to the sixties and early seventies; it being the case that very respectable maritime and fishing nations
from the Grotius side of the field began adopting a 12-mile exclu32. Young, Pan American Discussions on Offshore Claims, in Editorial
Comment, 50 A.m. J. IxT'L L. 909 (1956).
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sive fishing zone. The Malta proposal reopened the whole debate
in 1967, and within a short time the conservation and fishing issues were again at the top of the agenda, now as autonomous
issues on their own, freed for good from any tutelage to the continental shelf doctrine.
A.

The Early Stage: Shelf and Fisheries

Any attempt to suggest that the continental shelf is a submarine
extension of the land territory which may only be used by the
riparian State to obtain minerals, oil and gas, is doomed to an utter
rebuttal by the fact that sedentary fisheries had been the first
economic venture undertaken by societies and States on the shallow
bottom of the adjacent sea. Long before man ever dreamt of turning oil into energy, thousands of fishermen along the shores of Ceylon, Bahrein, Eritrea, Tunis and Cubagua (off Venezuela) had
learned to make a living diving for pearls, oysters, and sponges in
shallow waters. Vattel's exclamation on the legitimacy of the ownership of such fisheries is too well known to be fully cited. Nevertheless, neither these special fishing rights nor the ones established by tunneling could be turned into a basis for claims over
the continental shelf at large, for three reasons summed by Sir
Cecil Hurst: sedentary fisheries occupy relatively small areas out of
a vast total; there is a great variety of natural resources in the
shelf which demand different methods of exploitation; such exploitation may require installations that may interfere with the free3s
dom of navigation and fishing.
A group of States with interests in sedentary fisheries pressed
the Geneva Conference to admit sedentary living organisms as part
of the recognized natural resources of the continental shelf. According to a proposal submitted by Australia, Ceylon, Malaya,
India, Norway and the United Kingdom, the shelf resources would
consist of mineral and other non-living resources of the seabed and
and the subsoil together with living organisms belonging to sedentary species, that is to say, organisms which, at the harvestable
stage, either are immobile on or under the seabed or are unable to
move except
in constant physical contact with the seabed or the
subsoil.3 4
33. The Collected Papers of Sir Cecil Hurst (1950), Law of the Shallow

Sea, THE Rou-D TABLE, No. 179, June, 1955, at 235-63.
34. 6 United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF. 13/C.4/L.36 (1958). Distinction should be made between the

That was all the Conference seemed ready to digest. Burma
and Yugoslavia failed to include bottom swimming fish in the inventory, meeting with opposition from a State like India whose delegate admitted that his country would be favored, but the measure
35
would not be consistent with scientific precepts.
It should not be forgotten, however, that a pioneer biological
approach to the continental shelf doctrine had been undertaken at
the turn of the century by Portugal, Spain and Argentina who
favored the extension of State jurisdiction over the epicontinental
waters. Senator Copeland's abortive bills aimed at reserving Alaska's fisheries to American nationals also conceived of the shelf as
a biological eco-system and not for oil supply.3 6 Nothing was
done to change the existing rule and the freedom of fishing continued to be regarded as one of the four cardinal pillars of the
regime of the high seas.
Again, it was President Truman's administration and particularly
Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes who set the next example. 37
Truman's "other" Proclamation (No. 2668) also released on September 28th, 1945, after expressing concern over adequate protection for fisheries contiguous to the coasts of the United States (with
Alaska's salmon fisheries on his mind), established conservation
zones in those fishing grounds on the high seas in such a way that
the United States would take that responsibility by itself in areas
where nationals alone had been or would be fishing, and would
establish them under agreement with any other States whose nationals had been regularly or would be fishing in the future. The
Proclamation, on conceding the same rights to other States with respect to their own coastal fisheries, confirmed the character of
8
high seas of the maritime areas concerned.
terms sedentary species and sedentary fisheries, in view of the fact that
the latter is sometimes wrongly used to qualify the former due to an old
tradition. It would be more consistent with logic to confine the term
sedentary fisheries to those fisheries conducted by means of an equipment
embedded in the floor of the sea in shallow waters beyond the territorial
sea, as in India and Burma. Article 13 of the Convention on Fisheries and
Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas defines them,
stipulating the exceptional cases in which the coastal State could exclusively control them. In such fisheries the sedentary is the gear; in pearl
and sponge fisheries defined under the Convention on the Continental
Shelf the sedentary is the fish.
35. Id., A/CONF. 13/C.4/L.3 and L.13.
36. For an account on this early "biological" stage, see MouToN, supra
note 9, at 46-63, 216. Cf. DE FEtmON, supra note 21, at 134-38.
37. See McDouGAL &Bu=x, supra note 23, at 966-67.
38. Laws and Regulations on the Regime of the High Seas, 1 U.N.L.S.
112-13, (1951).
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Analyzed by itself and on its own merits, this Proclamation
would not suggest any move towards the extension of United
States jurisdiction or sovereignty over the living resources of the
adjacent seas, let alone the marine area as such. The proposed conservation zones would probably constitute a kind of special contiguous zone for conservation purposes, expressly recognized as
part of the high seas with a certain control exercised by and from
the coastal State. Similarly, the already mentioned Proclamation
on the continental shelf, analyzed by itself and on its own merits,
would not reveal that the living resources of the shelf were expressly included, though they were not expressly excluded either.
If neither Proclamation contained a loophole in which other States
might fit in a new practice meant to extend their jurisdiction or
sovereignty eo nomine over the adjacent sea for conservation purposes, their simultaneous announcement was, by itself, the loophole.3 9 What Professor George Scelle once described as the inflationary process of the Truman Proclamations turned indeed into a
Pandora's box which the Administration was not able to close. The
law of the sea would never be the same after Harry S. Truman
40
put his signature to those twin papers.
Mexico's President Avila Camacho issued a Declaration dated
October 29, 1945, whereby the issues dealt with in Truman's twin
Proclamations were united in one body; besides the continental
shelf measured down to the 200-meter isobath, Mexico added "every
known natural resource" after having made a direct reference to
the depletion of fisheries. Freedom of navigation, however, was
41
recognized.
In 1946, Argentina moved one more step forward by extending her sovereignty over her extraordinary ample continental
shelf -and the epicontinental waters thereof, thus reviving an old
Argentine ideal advocated by scientists and naval experts such as
Jose Leon Suarez and Segundo Storni. That same year Panama
promulgated a new constitution which included the continental
shelf as part of the territory.
39. Selak, Recent Developments on High Seas Fisheries Under the

PresidentialProclamationof 1945, 40 Am. J. INT'L. L. 670 (1950).
40. Nweihed, Truman Y El Mar, El Nacional, Dec. 30, 1972, at A-6.
41. See EL UNIVESAL, Vol. 116, No. 10.541 at 17.7. For Comments, see
F.V. Garcia Amador, Latin America and Law of the Sea, Proceedings of
the Seventh Annual Conference of the Law of the Sea Institute, 1972,
at 28.

When it came to the South Pacific Latin American nations of
Chile and Peru (later joined by Ecuador), the absence of a geomorphological shelf off their coasts would have rendered a Trumanstyle declaration quite meaningless. Nevertheless, there is another
reality that would have never fit into Trumen's scheme, for the
presence of an extraordinary wealth of anchovies feeding on plankton made fabulously available by the Peru or Humboldt cold current at a distance that may vary from 50 to 200 miles from the
coast is a fact that the coastal countries cannot possibly overlook.
Consequently, Chile and Peru, under separate unilateral claims announced in 1947, extended their sovereignty and jurisdiction not
only over their meager continental shelf but over an adjacent
maritime zone whose breadth was initially fixed at 200 nautical
miles, where they would exercise "protection and control", while
confirming the right of free navigation on the surface. Five years
later, Ecuador joined her southern neighbors in signing the Santiago Declaration of 18 August 1952, which set up a Permanent
Commission for the Exploitation and Conservation of the Maritime
Resources of the South Pacific while confirming the three States'
sovereignty and jurisdiction over the adjacent sea up to a maximum
of 200 miles, with the concession that innocent passage would not
be restricted.
In the meanwhile, a few more Latin American republics had adhered to the 200-mile limit policy, evidently with view to protecting and exploiting adjacent fisheries, and more than a means to explore or exploit the mineral resources of the shelf. Such are the
cases of Costa Rica (1949), Honduras (1950) and, El Salvador (1959),
which was the first nation in the world to designate her 200-mile
zone as plain territorial sea, though provisions were made not to restrict the freedom of navigation.
The diplomatic protests of the main maritime powers did not alter the new situation, neither did such serious incidents as the capture of Onassis' Olympic Fishing Fleet by Peruvian patrol vessels in 1954 or the previous conflict between Californian fishermen and the Ecuadorian government.
Aside from this shift in Latin American maritime legislation and
policy, South Korea, nervous about Japan's comeback to the high
seas, issued a Proclamation in 1952, to the effect of extending her
sovereignty over the shelf and its epicontinental waters within
an artificial diagram (Syngman Rhee Line) whose breadth varied
from 20 to 200 miles. Disputes concerning fisheries ensued at once
with the Japanese who were also running into trouble with
Australia on account of her proclamation regarding the Pearl

[voL. 11: 603, 1974]

Venezuela's Contribution to Law of the Sea
SAN DIEGO LAW PEVIEW

Fisheries Act of 1952-53, which extended Australia's jurisdiction
over foreign vessels operating in pearl fisheries on the continental
shelf to a depth of 100 fathoms. Moreover, Iceland increased the
size of her fishing grounds first by closing her bays and fjords
from headland to headland and then by extending her territorial
waters limit to 4 nautical miles in 1952.42
All these developments within less than ten years after the Paria
Treaty and seven from Truman's Proclamations made more urgent
and indispensable the task entrusted to the International Law
Commission on preparing text articles of a future convention on the
law of the sea. Europe had wisely refrained from tangling the
web further by the addition of more unilateral declarations. The
continental shelf doctrine being a Western Hemisphere creation,
it seemed rather logical that the American States should agree on
one version or another before taking the matter to the Geneva
Conference.
Richard Young, a witness of the process with a deep knowledge
of the problem from the very beginning, introduces this stage in his
comments on Panamerican Discussion on Offshore Claims by saying:
In an effort to deal with a situation which was obviously on its
way to becoming an irritant to good inter-American relations, the
Tenth Inter-American Conference at Caracas in March, 1954, resolved to convene an Inter-American Specialized Conference on
'Conservation of Natural Resources: The Continental Shelf and
Marine Waters,' which was duly held at Cuidad Trujillo from
March 15 to March 28, 1956. To assist this conference with a preparatory study, the topic was later placed on the agenda of the
Third Meeting of the Inter-American Council of
Jurists, held at
Mexico City from January 17 to February 4, 1956.43

The Mexico City meeting adopted five principles on territorial
waters, continental shelf, conservation of living resources of the
high seas, base lines and bays, but so many restrictive statements
and reservations were appended that all that was left could not be
taken as a measure of continental consensus, but rather as an
expression of a group of individual positions. The Ciudad Trujillo
(now Santo Domingo) Conference ran into better luck in as much as
it deliberately abstained from recommending a single treatment
42. S. ODA, INTERNATIONAL CoNTRoL OF SEA REsOURCEs 21-44 (1963).

43. Young, supra note 32, at 910.

of the unsettled questions, that is to say, the breadth of the territorial sea and the juridical condition of the epicontinental waters.
Its notable success lies in having been able to separate the continental shelf notion as a primarily submarine and geologic reality
from the fisheries and conservation issue which is, fundamentally,
a biological and ecological approach. Consulting the patient work
of the International Law Commission on the most adequate definition of the continental shelf, the Conference adopted the so-called
double definition which was destined to substantiate the Geneva
Convention two years later: the outer limit would be the 200meter isobath or, beyond that limit, to where the depth of the
superjacent waters admits the exploitation (not the mere exploration) of the natural resources of the sea-bed and subsoil.
Four members of the 200-mile group-Chile, Ecuador, Peru,
Costa Rica-and El Salvador under separate declaration, made it
clear that their vote for a resolution that cleared the continental
shelf could not alter or prejudice their previous views or decisions. 44
Venezuela attended both conferences and attached a conciliatory note to both resolutions while a legislative committee was waiting for the results with a view to drafting a new and comprehensive municipal law on the maritime provinces, including territorial sea, contiguous zone, continental shelf and fisheries. Soon
after Venezuela's delegation to Ciudad Trujillo, headed by the late
Dr. Ramon Carmona, was back in Caracas, the Interministerial
Committee designated five subcommittees to work out the new
45
legislation.
Since the approbation of the Treaty of Paria, Venezuela had
not issued any unilateral declaration on the continental shelf. She
had stayed wisely neutral watching the South Pacific nations go to
200 miles and the maritime powers adhere more firmly than ever
to the 3-mile limit. Then, and not before a global appraisal of the
situation following the Ciudad Trujillo Conference, the Legislative
Assembly sanctioned the Law on Territorial Sea, Continental Shelf,
Protection of Fisheries and Airspace, promulgated on July 27, 1956.
In the Dominican Republic, the Venezuelan delegate had requested to leave on record a statement in which the Venezuelan
government expressed its support for a 12-mile wide territorial
sea as the most adequate measure. 46 This criterion was embodied

44. Texts in Organizachi6n de Eslados Americanos, Derecho del Mar I,
at 65, OEA/Ser. Q. II. 4, CJI-7 (1971). It may be useful to add that
Honduras and Costa Rica, in later stages, abandoned the 200-mile limit.
45. Young, supra note 32, at 910.
46. Ainisterio de Relaciones Exteriores, Libro Amarillo (1957).
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in Title I of the aforesaid law which, in Article 3, declared an additional 3-mile contiguous zone for vigilance and security purposes.
It may be worthy of mention that only a few nations in the world
had adopted by then the present standard universal breadth of the
territorial sea de lege ferenda. The Soviet Union, Romania, Bulgaria and Guatemala could be cited as examples before Venezuela
joined the 12-mile group.
The most notable aspect of this law, however, was the definition
it accorded to the continental shelf; not because it was different
or special, but because it was the first in the world to apply the
future definition approved in Geneva to a municipal law well in
advance; it became evident that the double definition of the outer
limit would soon prevail. Regarding the nature of the relationship
between State and shelf, the essence of the annexation formula
born in the Paria Treaty was maintained through a combination
of the terms appurtenance and sovereignty over the sea-bed and
subsoil, and not just the resources. The legislation included accidental trenches and troughs within the shelf, as in the case of the
Cariaco Trench off Eastern Venezuela. The next case of a country
to adopt the double criterion of depth and exploitability was registered in Honduras in 1957. 47 Needless to say, the entry into force
of the Convention generalized this definition on a universal scale.
It is important to take note of the attention paid by the legislators
to the exercise of sovereignty over the installations to be erected
on the shelf, as well as to the protection of navigation and marine
life, which reflects the permanent influence of the Gulf of Paria
Treaty.
Title III empowers the government to explore and exploit sedentary fisheries, while Article 8 authorizes it to fix maritime fishing
zones outside the territorial sea for the purpose of development,
conservation and rational exploitation of their living resources, on
the general lines of President Truman's second Proclamation on
coastal fisheries. A meticulous distinction between the shelf and
coastal fisheries regimes is worthy of notice.4 s
47. HoNmuRAs CONSITUTiON, Art. 6, Congressional decree No. 21,
Feb. 19, 1957; Limits in the Sea, National Claims to Maritime Jurisdictions,
36 GEOGRAPHER 46 (1972).
48. Compilaci6n Legislativa de Venezuela, 1956, Ley Sobre Mar Territorial, Plata forma Continental Protecci6n de la Pesca y Espacio Aereo.
K. NwImD, LA VirENciA DEL MAR 492-94 (1973).

B. The ContemporaryStage: The Economic Sea
If it is quite true that the conclusion of the Geneva Conventions was intended, inter alia, to put an end to the series of national claims to extensive jurisdiction over the adjacent sea, the
legal instruments by means of which those claims had been consolidated have survived the Geneva Conferences, bearing all the
force which their authors had designed them to bear. Thus, Chile,
Peru, Ecuador, El Salvador, Korea, Iceland and any other coastal
nation that had advanced its jurisdiction over the adjacent sea, irrespective of what the continental shelf doctrine had or did not have
to do with their decision, were bound to confirm, stand and defend
a policy common to all. Few of them signed the Geneva Conventions ad referendum, their attitude being especially critical of
the Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources
of the High Seas. The lukewarm reception this Treaty was
awarded by developing nations, (and not surprisingly by the Soviet
bloc) despite its concessions to the coastal State's "special interest
in the maintenance of the productivity of the living resources
in any area of the seas adjacent to its territorial sea," could only
be assessed as a rebuff to the half-measures approach this Convention symbolizes. "This instrument," wrote Ambassador Jorge Castafieda from Mexico, "has truly proved to be a dead-letter. Instead,
the unilateral claims that it was supposed to have stopped, have
49
more than doubled since 1958."
None of the 200-mile group has subsequently ratified or acceded
to the Geneva Conventions and, after a prudent truce, "tuna
hostilities" broke out again between Ecuador and United States
fishermen in 1965. The five years which elapsed between the
Second Geneva Conference and the revival of the jurisdictional
trend in the mid-sixties witnessed a very significant change in
the attitude of the conservatives, as the so-called "exclusive fishing
zone" emerged from the rubble of the Second Geneva Conference
(1960) as a pragmatic and autonomous compromise between
two extremes which had failed to win the day at Geneva. It may
be recalled that Canada and the United States had tried to gain
support for their 6+6 formula, that is to say, a 6-mile territorial sea
plus a 6-mile exclusive fishing zone, as an attempt at separating the
territorial sea issue from jurisdiction over coastal high sea fisheries.
Defeated by one vote, this measure developed into a common State
practice on its own soon after. It is probably a rare case of an
abortive positive law rule that has survived, thanks to subsequent
49. Castafieda, Alternatives to Fisheries Management, GuLF AN
BEAN MAITIME PROBLEMS 21 (1973).
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usage and, thence, custom. Iceland was the first country to enact
a similar measure in 1958, defying Great Britain and risking what
has been called the "First Cod War." Soon after the Second
Geneva Conference, which had been convened on this particular
and other related issues, Albania decreed the measure, and was
soon followed by several new African States. Denmark and Ireland
thereupon approved, but it was only when the United Kingdom
came along in 1964, convening simultaneously a European conference on fisheries, that the whole picture changed in Western Europe.
In 1966, the United States, harassed by foreign fishermen just
beyond the territorial 3-mile limit off Florida and New England,
enacted the measure which was tantamount to enlarging the territorial sea up to 12 miles, but only in terms of exclusive fishing.5 0
The renewal of friction off the coasts of Ecuador started the second drive towards the 200-mile limit. Panama, Argentina and
Uruguay proclaimed their sovereignty over the adjacent sea
through municipal legislation, notwithstanding the use of different
legal modalities. The circle was closed by Brazil whose joining the
group in 1970, meant that virtually every South American nation
facing either ocean had gone for the 200-mile limit. Colombia and
Venezuela stayed aloof for obvious geographical reasons.
Distributed geographically, the nine members of the 200-mile
group could be handily located in three distinct areas: three on
the Pacific (Peru, Ecuador, Chile, known as PEC), three on the Atlantic (Argentina, Uruguay, Brazil) and three from Central America (El Salvador, Panama and Nicaragua.) During 1970, they
realized two important regional meetings on the law of the sea;
the first at Montevideo in May (hence the term Montevideo Group),
and the second at Lima in August, when they invited all the remaining Latin American countries to join, besides several observers from Asia, Africa and Canada.
The Declarations of Montevideo and Lima are quite similar in
their adherence to certain principles that confirm, once and for all,
the validity of the 200-mile jurisdiction policy as a line of no return.
Venezuela was the only coastal Latin American State to vote
negatively on the Lima Declaration. Since Article 2 asserted the
50. ODA, InternationalLaw
CouRs (1969).

of the Resources of the Sea, 127 RECUEIL

DES

right of each riparian State to establish the limits of its maritime
sovereignty or jurisdiction according to 'reasonable criteria, and
since this particular disposition bore on all the rest of the document, Venezuela's delegation put on record that it was not
able to admit any extension of the territorial sea that might diminish or affect rights of free navigation or rights that Venezuela enjoyed in the seas adjacent to her territory.51
That lone stand at Lima, typical of a conservative attitude towards the law of the sea, might have been necessary at that time,
but it did not help to stress the image of Latin American cooperation and solidarity. Venezuela's role as the nation that led
South America to political independence in the early nineteenth
century would not be compatible with an ocean policy that might
be interpreted in elusive and individual terms, even if it were
perfectly valid from a legal point of view. But the same circumstances which stem from the objective geographical fact regarding
the closeness of other jurisdictions on islands off Venzuela's Caribbean coast demanded a vigorous, pragmatic and positive ocean
policy that would fall in line with the undeniable trend registered
in Latin America without precipitating unnecessary conflicts with
friendly Caribbean neighbors.
By then, Malta had set off a vigorous movement in the United
Nations around her proposal aimed at the reservation of the seabed and ocean floor beyond national jurisdiction for peaceful uses
in the benefit of mankind. A sea-bed committee, eventually enlarged and adequately helped by three subcommittees, has been acting upon the mandate of the General Assembly with a view to convening a universal Third United Nations Conference on the Law
of the Sea. Venzuela was elected to join the Committee in December 1970, on the occasion of doubling the Commitee's membership
and the enunciation of the Declaration of Principles on the sea-bed
and ocean floor. In other words, two fronts were open to the
country for action on the law of the sea: on a regional (Latin
American) and a sub-regional (Caribbean) scale; and within the
United Nations Sea-Bed Committee.
It was on the Committee level that Ambassador Andres Aguilar
Mawdsley submitted the notion of the patrimonial sea for the first
time on August 12, 1971, in Geneva. The historic event may be
better summarized by a statement from Professor L.D.M. Nelson,
from the London School of Economics, who has recently written:
51. For the full texts and individual State's declarations, see OEA,

Derecho del Mar, supranote 44, at 241-55.
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The first appearance on the international plane of the notion of the
patrimonial sea eo nomine was in August 1971 when the Venezuelan delegate submitted it to the United Nations Deep Seabed
Committee as a compromise proposal de lege ferenda.52

The term "patrimonial sea," reminiscent of canon 1aw and Roman
tradition, was first employed, as has been repeatedly stated, by the
Chilean diplomat and delegate to the Inter-American Juridical
Committee, Professor Edmundo Vargas Carrefio in a report presented to that Committee also in 1971. The six main points on
which Vargas Carrefio's proposal rested can be described as a
reasonable attempt to separate the territorial sea jurisdiction, essentially based on defense and security, from the economic and
social motivations of the proposed patrimonial marine zone. The
Chiliean professor, however, used the term to cover the sum of
both the inner jurisdiction of the coastal State (territorial sea) and
the outer jurisdiction (economic or patrimonial zone),5 3 which is
not exactly the thesis expounded in Geneva by Ambassador Aguilar
who clearly stressed the division between one belt and another,
avoiding any authorization of the coastal State to fix for itself the
extent of its jurisdiction.
Since Venzuela's thesis was largely adopted by a majority of Caribbean nations and embodied in the Declaration of Santo Domingo
given on June 9, 1972, it may be more adequately summarized by
direct reference to the Declaration. The notion rests on three
grounds: a territorial sea, strictu sensu, not wider than 12 nautical
miles; a patrimonial sea for economic purposes not to exceed 200
nautical miles from the coast (or 188 miles from the outer and
maximum limit of the territorial sea); innocent passage for foreign
vessels within the territorial sea, and freedom of navigation on the
patrimonial sea.
The notion acquires its full sense when the nature of a State's
rights in both zones is analyzed, both in comparative and in absolute terms. Within the patrimonial zone the State is empowered
to exercise sovereign rights over renewable and non-renewable
natural resources in waters, sea-bed and subsoil. This criterion,
52. Nelson, The PatrimonialSea, 22 INT'L & Compu'. L. QuART. 68-86 (1973).
53. Carreflo, Mar Territorialy Mar Patrimonial Bases para una Posici6n
Latino Americiana sobre Derecho del Mar, Document CCM/CPI3, Conference of the Carribean Foreign Ministers, Preparatory Committee, Feb.
2, 1972.

by doing away with any unnecessary and outdated reference to
the continental shelf doctrine, separates the fishing function from
the regime of the high seas and attaches it to the authority of the
riparian State, leaving intact the other three traditional liberties,
namely navigation, overflight and the laying of submarine cables
and pipes. The continental shelf regime, as provided in the Geneva Convention, will not disappear completely, for wherever the
shelf lies entirely within the patrimonial limits, the patrimonial regime will prevail, and in cases where the shelf extends beyond the
200-mile limit of the patrimonial sea, the shelf regime will be in
force from the said limit seawards.
With respect to the delimitation of patrimonial sea zones between
neighboring States, the Santo Domingo Declaration provides that
it should be carried out in accordance with peaceful procedures
stipulated in the charter of the United Nations.
The other two major States in the Caribbean area, Mexico and
Colombia, lent their full support to the patrimonial sea concept. In
November, 1971, the Venezuelan Foreign Ministry invited the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Caribbean and Gulf Area to an informal meeting at Caracas to discuss the idea. Colombia's Minister
of Foreign Affairs, Dr. Alfredo Vazquez Carrizosa, brought to the
meeting a similar version of the same notion, easily fusible with
the original. It was decided to call for a Specialized Conference
to be held in Santa Domingo, Dominican Republic, and by the end
of May, 1972, a Preparatory Committee sat in Bogota to prepare the
agenda, finishing its job by February. The Santo Domingo meeting
was attended by fifteen Caribbean States, including El Salvador
and Guyana due to their strong economic commitment to the
area. The Declaration on the Patrimonial Sea was affirmed by ten
delegations (Venezuela, Colombia, Mexico, Costa Rica, Nicaragua,
Guatemala,, Honduras, Haiti, Dominican Republic, Trinidad &
Tobago), with five abstentions (Panama, El Salvador, Jamaica,
54
Barbados and Guyana).

Aside from the fundamental issues already referred to, the Declaration recognizes the sea-bed and its resources, beyond the patrimonial sea, as a common heritage of mankind, in accordance with
United Nations Resolution 2749 (XXV) of December 17, 1970.
In the spirit of the Paria Treaty, the Santo Domingo Declaration
calls upon the signatory governments to abstain from performing
acts which may pollute the sea and the sea-bed, either inside or
54. Conferencia Especializada de los Paises del Cariba, CCM/RC/12
Rev. 1, CCM/RC/11, Santo Domingo. For the English text, see U.N. Doc.
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outside their respective jurisdictions. International responsibility
of physical or juridical persons for damaging the marine environment is recognized and recommended to an international agreement.
Professor Nelson, who has done a thorough conceptual analysis of
the Declaration, considers particularly important the idea that the
coastal State, within its patrimonial zone, acts as an agent or custodian of -the international community, just as it would be with respect to control and prevention of marine pollution. The criticism
aimed at the patrimonial sea regime in a sense that it would result
in underfishing, is refuted by Professor Nelson on the grounds that
riparian States will have to enter in agreements with other fishing
nations from outside. In support of his opinion Professor Nelson
cited a few recent agreements: Belgium and Iceland in 1972, Brazil
and Trinidad in 1971, and Brazil-United States on shrimp conservation in 1972.r 5

The suggestion that the patrimonial sea notion carries a potential
violation of the fundamental freedom of the high seas de lege lata
has been affirmed by Judge Fitzmaurice in the Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v. Iceland, February 2, 1973) in his recent Separate Opinion
which he based on the Geneva Convention of Fisheries.5 6
On
the other hand, and according to the Dissenting Opinion of Judge
Luis Padilla Nervo in the same case,
...

the recognition of the concept of the patrimonial sea which

extends from the territorial sea to a distance fixed by the coastal
state concerned, in exercise of its sovereign rights, for the purpose
of protecting the resources on which its economic development and
the livelihood of its people depend
is entailed by the progressive
development of international law.5 7
A significant step towards the accomplishment of a patrimonial
sea regime was taken when Colombia, Mexico and Venezuela submitted a joint project to Subcommittee II of the Sea-bed Committee on April 2, 1973. Drawn in 18 articles the draft treaty gathers
the essential principles of the Santo Domingo Declaration and adds
55. Nelson, supra note 52, at 681-82.
56. Id. at 678.

57. See Auburn, Some Legal Problems of the Commercial Exploitation

of Manganese Nodules in the Pacific Ocean, 1 OcEw DEv. & INTL L.J.
185 (1973).

a few more issues such as artifical islands and special interests
in the productivity of living resources in the adjacent sea.58
Another noteworthy aspect to be mentioned is what Johnston
and Gold have described as the merger of sentiment common to
many of the developing countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America. Thus, the economic zone, as the African counterpart of the
patrimonial sea, though somewhat more restrictive, entails a major support to the same principles from an extremely active and
cautious continent. 59
AN IMsTORIcAL NoTE
The first scholar to raise a voice against the depletion of the
ocean resources was the great Venezuelan-born teacher Andres Bello. As early as 1852, Bello warned against overfishing and advocated a sort of control by the riparian State. Describing -him as the
"Spiritual Father of the Patrimonial Sea" is not an exaggeration.
Bello's three life periods, spread over Caracas, London and Santiago,
left him face to face with the three kinds of "seas" which the patrimonial sea notion has made compatible: in his home country, the
sea meant defense and security; in London, it spoke of trade and
navigation; in Santiago it suggested bounty and infinitude. These
stages in one man's rich and generous life reflect the three pillars
of the contemporary patrimonial sea concept.6 0
It may require a deeper research into his thoughts and writings
to find out whether he had intended to establish a philosophy
for the law of the sea in his epoch. Be that as it may, his ideas
have always beaconed light to Chileans, Venezuelans and Latin
Americans as a whole.

58. A/AC.138/SC.II/L.21.

59. D. Johnston & E. Gold, The Economic Zone in the Law of the Sea:
Survey Analysis of Current Trends, Proceedings of the Seventh Annual
Conference of the Law of the Sea Institute, 1972, at 7. Cf. Aguilar, The
PatrimonalSea, Proceedings at 161-62.
60. K. NwEnm

(1973).
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Map of the whole Gulf of Paria showing the 1942 Treaty boundary (ABBX-XY), straight black line, and the would-be median line applied to
same area (intermittent line).
Taken from North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, International Court of
Justice, Vol I, 1968, p. 498.

